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Abstract 
 
It is widely believed that the impact of fake news, 
internet rumors, hoaxes, deceptive memes etc. are 
spilling into the physical world from the virtual world. 
In fact, social media has had a significant role in the 
origination and spread of such deceptive 
communication, as social media users often lack 
awareness of the intentional manipulation of online 
content and are easily tricked into believing 
unverifiable content. In an increasingly polarized 
world where social media and the internet have 
pushed people to live inside “echo chambers” and 
“filter bubbles,” people consciously and 
unconsciously are exposed only to content that 
reinforce their confirmation bias. In such a scenario, 
people only agree with content that aligns with their 
preexisting beliefs and disagree with or label as 
“fake” content that is opposed to their worldview. This 
paper proposes to study the psychological differences 
that cause people to either agree or disagree with such 
prejudiced and ideologically oriented online 
disinformation.  
 
1. Introduction  
Disinformation, the English translation of the 
Russian word Dezinformatsiya, was coined by Joseph 
Stalin to ostensibly refer to dissemination of false 
reports to mislead public opinion in the Soviet Union 
by the West [51]. In contemporary usage, the 
University of Michigan Library’s Research Guide 
describes disinformation as deliberate, while 
misinformation is the inadvertent creation and spread 
of inaccurate information. The larger ecosystem of 
mis-and disinformation is roughly of 7 types: satire or 
parody, misleading content, imposter content, 
fabricated content, false connection, false context and 
manipulated content. In this paper we focus on 
disinformation that is partisan, sensationalist and 
inflammatory in nature, and designed to sway public 
opinion towards political ends, deepen societal 
fissures, pit one group against another, foment hatred, 
and incite violence. Such disinformation with an intent 
to deceive is widespread. 
In July 2016, the now defunct website 
wtoe5news.com spread lies that Pope Francis had 
endorsed Donald Trump in his bid for US presidency. 
Allcott and Gentzkow [16] studied the phenomenon of 
rampant disinformation that was circulated during the 
2016 US Presidential elections but stopped short of 
providing an assessment on the pivotal role it played 
in electing one candidate over the other. 
Disinformation not only affects political discourse but 
also affects social discourse. During the same election, 
North Carolina resident, Edgar Maddison Welch, 
armed with an assault rifle, fired a shot at a 
Washington DC pizza joint where he had come to 
“self-investigate” an alleged claim that US 
Presidential Candidate, Hillary Clinton, with her 
campaign chief, John Podesta, was running a 
pedophilia ring out of the restaurant [49].   
Disinformation is not limited to the US – it has 
worldwide ramifications. In Germany, during 2016, 
there were false reports that a 13-year-old girl named 
Lisa F of Russian origin was raped in Berlin by a group 
of refugees from the Middle East. This news caused 
hundreds to take to the streets in protest alongside far 
right and anti-Islamic groups [50]. In Myanmar, 
disinformation tinged with religious hatred was 
circulated on social media, leading to violence against 
the minority Rohingya Muslims by the majority 
Buddhist population [50]. During the run up to the 
European Union referendum in Britain, the Vote 
Leave campaign bankrolled nearly a billion targeted 
digital advertisements on social media, and among 
them was an image of a bus painted with the slogan 
“We send the EU £350 million a week,” which was 
later found to be untrue [7]. In the Philippines, during 
the 2016 presidential campaign, a blog named Mocha 
Uson Blog, which previously used to provide sex 
related advice, propagated disinformation in support 
of presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte [41]. In 
India, several Union Government Ministers have been 
compelled to delete misleading tweets and posts after 
being fact-checked online, and most such 
disinformation “appear[s] to support India’s ruling 
Bharatiya Janata Party and its right-wing Hindu 
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nationalist agenda” [52]. Similarly, disinformation has 
surfaced in Australia, Brazil, Italy and elsewhere. But, 
disinformation or propaganda is not a new 
phenomenon. It is almost as old as civilization itself. 
In 13th Century BC, emperor Rameses the Great 
spread falsehoods about his supposed victory in the 
Battle of Kadesh against the Hittites, when the battle 
was actually a stalemate [57]. In 1475 AD a Franciscan 
preacher, Bernardino da Feltre, spread a rumor in 
Trent, Italy, that the Jewish community murdered a 
two-and-a-half-year-old child named Simonino and 
drank his blood to celebrate Passover. This resulted in 
the torture of the Jewish community, with 15 people 
burned alive at the stake. These false “blood libel” 
stories were responsible, in part, in laying the 
foundation for anti-Semitism [35]. During World War 
I, the Allied press was awash with false propaganda 
about a supposed factory which extracted body fat 
from dead German soldiers to manufacture 
nitroglycerine, candles, soaps, lubricants etc. This 
story on the “German Corpse factory” was later used 
by Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, during 
World War II, to deny the ongoing massacre of Jews 
in Nazi concentration camps and described it as British 
propaganda [6]. 
 All these anecdotal accounts of online or offline 
disinformation have an underlying consistency: they 
were either ethnocentrically prejudiced or were 
ideologically motivated. As a matter of fact, a 
significant portion of disinformation and propaganda 
that are in circulation online are politically motivated 
and are propagated with the aim of political or social 
polarization by appealing to our inherent and primal 
prejudices. Such ideologically oriented and prejudiced 
disinformation is not only consumed but also believed. 
Contentiously, ideological orientation has had a very 
controversial history in research on prejudice. The 
controversy arises due to research that has consistently 
found correlation between prejudice and conservatism 
as if conservatives are the “designated villains” of 
prejudice.  Two reasons are forwarded for this 
correlation between prejudice and conservatism: (a) 
conservatism does not cause prejudice but prejudiced 
individuals use conservative beliefs to justify their 
prejudice, and (b) compared to liberals, conservatives 
are more likely to see people themselves, as opposed 
to economic and social conditions, being responsible 
for negative outcomes, such as high unemployment 
rate among blacks being a result of laziness. This is not 
to say that liberals are not prejudiced. Research has 
linked a covert form of prejudice, aversive racial 
prejudice, to liberals where people avoid contact with 
a racial outgroup or at most try to be polite [3]. In the 
world of online disinformation this may have 
significant repercussions. Vosoughi et al. [45], in a 
cover story for Science, investigated Twitter rumor 
cascades and concluded that falsehood diffuses 
“farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly” than truth 
on social media, as humans are more likely to spread 
it than bots. Such disinformation on social media is 
shared and consumed by both poles of the ideological 
spectrum. But there is empirical evidence of an 
asymmetry in the pattern of creation and propagation 
of disinformation on social media. The Computational 
Propaganda Project at the Oxford Internet Institute 
found that on Twitter and Facebook, right leaning 
groups shared the widest range of extremist, 
sensationalist, conspiratorial, fake and other forms of 
“junk” news, compared to all other ideological groups 
put together in the lead up to the 2016 US presidential 
election [54]. The Berkman Klein Center for Internet 
& Society at Harvard University reiterates that during 
the same election the “more insulated right-wing 
media ecosystem was susceptible to sustained network 
propaganda and disinformation” and the 
“hyperpartisan, unreliable sources on the left did not 
receive the same amplification that equivalent sites on 
the right did [40].” This stark asymmetry in diffusion 
of disinformation on social media along ideological 
lines and the mature social psychology literature on 
prejudice and conservatism encourages a closer look 
at this unfolding phenomenon. Hence, our research 
question is as follows:  Do individual differences of 
prejudice and conservative self-placement have an 
effect on the perceived credibility of disinformation 
that diffuses on social media? Hence, we examine the 
psychological variables that determine why some of us 
are more prejudiced and ideologically conservative 
than others. However, disinformation diffusion in the 
left-wing media ecosystem is equally noxious. For 
instance, disinformation showing a photograph of 
detained immigrant children separated from their 
parents in orange jumpsuits at US borders shared by 
the left leaning Occupy Democrats group [47] also has 
the potential to further deepen the cracks in an already 
divided society. Although, this paper focuses on only 
one pole of the ideological spectrum, further research 
that focuses on the opposite pole is also necessary. 
Together, it may explain why we agree or disagree 
with certain content even though they are outright 
falsehoods and consciously or unconsciously allow 
ourselves to be deceived by such content. The paper is 
organized as follows. First, we briefly review the 
literature on online deception and its detection. We 
then provide the theoretical background and introduce 
our conceptual model. We conclude by discussing the 
implications. 
 
2. Literature Review: Deception Detection 
The boundary between traditional news and user 
generated content is gradually blurring [59]. Modern 
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technologies, especially mobiles, allow instant posting 
and sharing of content, allowing people at the location 
of an event to become de facto news reporters. Even 
journalists themselves rely heavily on social media for 
information, and 54% of all US news journalists 
collect information from microblogging sites and 
report their stories [5]. This means that a large 
proportion of information that is consumed comes 
from complete strangers rather than from trusted 
sources [5]. Social media users have a general 
disposition of goodwill towards social media 
communication and are poor judges of the truthfulness 
of content that they consume [31]. The content in 
social media is often biased, unverifiable, subjective in 
nature, and created and shared with the intention to 
either attract online traffic for revenue or spread 
outright lies to create false impressions or beliefs. 
Thus, the potential for people to deceive by using 
computer-mediated communication has grown 
immensely with disastrous results [9]. Disinformation 
is often political in nature to sway opinion, and the 
impact is amplified as more and more people are 
drawn to social media to receive content by sacrificing 
caution for convenience [53]. In the US, 62 percent of 
adults get their news from social media, according to 
a Pew research study [19]. However, there is a 
growing awareness among social media platforms to 
look for tools to filter false content and reverse the 
trend. For example, Facebook has taken steps to 
identify news articles that are false and flag false 
articles as “disputed by 3rd party fact-checkers” [1]. 
This entire phenomenon of disinformation can be dealt 
with using the lens of the deception detection 
literature. The literature is both technical and 
behavioral in nature. As explained below, the technical 
research effort has focused on automated detection of 
deception, whereas the behavioral research effort has 
focused on the development of theories that inform on 
the psycho-sociological antecedents and consequences 
of deception detection. 
The literature on automated deception detection in 
computer mediated communication can be broadly 
classified into two categories viz. Linguistic Analysis 
and Network Analysis. There are several successful 
studies on deception detection that use linguistic cues 
to identify deceptive communication, as the language 
used by truth-tellers is different from that of deceivers. 
For instance, Zhou et al. [25] reviewed several systems 
for deception detection in textual communication and 
identified 27 linguistic features classified under 9 
broad conceptual clusters that are amenable to 
automation for classifying texts as either deceptive or 
truthful. Apart from linguistic analysis, Rubin [53] 
notes that false content can be detected based on 
“positioning of the message sources in the network, 
their reputation, trustworthiness, credibility, expertise, 
as well as propensity for spreading rumors” (p.12). 
These techniques fall under the category of Network 
Analysis. Liu et al. [58] proposed a technique to 
automatically debunk rumors on Twitter in real time 
by using verification features based upon insights from 
journalists. However, in spite of the progress in 
creating algorithms to detect false content, the success 
rate has not been substantial, and human fact checking, 
as done by Politifact and Snopes, is still more credible 
in identifying false content, even though it is 
expensive to employ human beings to sift through 
huge amounts of data that flood the social media every 
moment. Thus, Rubin [53] calls for a hybrid approach 
to false content detection. She asserts, “When 
analyzing social media for potentially deceptive 
content, it is important to apply methods that consider 
not just what is being said, but also how the message 
is presented, by who, and in what format and context. 
The hybrid approach should include text analytics, 
network analysis and world knowledge database 
incorporation to fully take advantage of linguistic, 
interpersonal, and contextual awareness.” (p.22) 
On the other hand, prominent theories and methods 
have been developed to analyze deceptive discourse in 
the behavioral stream. Such theories include Content-
Based Criteria Analysis (CBCA) [2], Reality 
Monitoring (RM) [30], Scientific Content Analysis 
(SCAN) [26], Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) 
[10], Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) [46], 
Leakage Theory [34], Prominence-Interpretation 
Theory (PIT) [4] and Four Factor Theory (FFT) [32]. 
Despite the development of such theories on deception 
detection, research has not been able to pinpoint a set 
of reliable behavioral indicators of deception, and 
investigation on behavioral cues such as posture shifts, 
pupil dilation, gaze aversion, fidgeting, or foot and 
hand movements haven’t led to much success. The 
running average for thousands of participants, who 
have participated in several deception detection 
experiments conducted over the decades, reveals that 
most participants are not very good at detecting 
deception, with documented success rates of just 54%, 
which is slightly better than chance [8]. Under these 
circumstances, our paper focuses on an entirely 
different set of attitudinal proclivities that may affect 
deception detection accuracy, and the attitudinal 
biases hinge on people’s ingrained belief systems. 
Though social psychological constructs may not have 
been explicitly investigated by deception detection 
researchers, Schindler et al. [44] have shown the effect 
of interaction between the Belief in Just World 
construct, drawn from the Just World Theory [29], and 
Mortality Salience construct, drawn from Terror 
Management Theory [21], on deception detection 
accuracy. 
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3. Theory and Propositions 
In developing our conceptual model, we draw 
heavily from the social and political psychology 
literature and the deception detection literature. We 
specifically base our conceptual model on the 
Expanded Prominence Interpretation Theory [18] and 
contend that individual differences and situational 
factors related to motivated social cognition play an 
important role in assessing the credibility of online 
disinformation. 
3.1. Research Model: Expanded Prominence 
Interpretation Theory (EPIT) 
George et al. [18] developed EPIT as an extension of 
the Prominence Interpretation Theory (PIT) of Fogg 
[4] by supplementing it with another theory based on 
the seminal work of Buller and Burgoon [10], 
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT). The original 
PIT theory was introduced after four years of 
extensive research on website credibility at Stanford’s 
Persuasive Technology Lab. The theory posits that 
two things happen when people assess the credibility 
of websites. The user first notices something 
(Prominence), and then the user makes a judgment 
about what was noticed (Interpretation). Initially, 
Fogg [4] proposed that five factors affect Prominence: 
(a) Involvement of the user, (b) the Topic of the 
website, (c) the Task the user is performing, (d) 
Experience of the user, and (e) Individual Differences. 
Interpretation, on the other hand, is impacted by three 
factors: (a) Assumptions in the user’s mind, (b) Skills 
or Knowledge of the user, and (c) Context in which the 
user operates. George et al. [18] added new factors and 
modified existing factors that affect Prominence and 
Interpretation, accounted for the temporal nature of 
communication, and incorporated relationships among 
Media, Credibility and Deception Detection. Even 
though both PIT and IDT are process models, George 
et al. [18] interpret EPIT as a causal model where 
Interpretation acts as a moderator on the link between 
Prominence and Credibility. They opine that the 
relationship between Prominence and Credibility 
holds even in the absence of a clearly articulated 
Interpretation, as Interpretation may be conscious or 
tacit. They also remark that the broad nature of EPIT 
can potentially deal with any type of Credibility, 
including Credibility of Information, as Credibility 
essentially acts as a mediator between the upstream 
construct of Media and a more general downstream 
construct of Judgement. Figure 1 depicts an adapted 
version of EPIT as proposed by George et al. [18] as a 
state in the communication process at one point in 
time. 
 
 
Figure 1. Expanded Prominence Interpretation Theory (EPIT) at one point in time in the 
communication process [18] 
Since we focus primarily on whether certain 
individuals than others are more likely to be deceived 
by prejudiced online content, we restrict ourselves to 
only Individual Differences that are linked with 
prejudice and that may have a plausible effect on 
Prominence, as well as a situational factor that may 
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influence the relationship between Individual 
Difference and Prominence. Additionally, George et 
al. [18] have indicated that the antecedents to 
Prominence are easy to measure and manipulate, but 
Interpretation is particularly difficult to identify, 
measure, and manipulate. Hence, our model only 
considers how Individual Differences bias Prominence 
moderated by a situational factor, and how 
Prominence in turn impacts Credibility assessment, 
while ignoring Interpretation (Figure 2). We now take 
recourse to the social and political psychology 
literature to argue that Individual Differences related 
to prejudice and political conservatism are a result of 
Motivated Social Cognition that conspicuously 
influence how we interpret information that transgress 
or bolster our cultural worldviews. Later, we also look 
at a situational factor that heightens prejudicial 
tendencies.   
3.2. Motivated Social Cognition 
Motivated Social Cognition or Motivated Reasoning 
allows people to believe what they want to believe, 
subject to certain reality constraints. Personal or social 
goals and motives that people have affect their 
reasoning, and they are likely to arrive at conclusions 
that they want to arrive at. Human beliefs are 
subjectively rational and are guided by both 
directional and non-directional motives based on a set 
of premises that the believers subscribe in [23]. 
Directional motives reflect the desire to reach a 
predetermined conclusion, while non-directional 
motives reflect the desire to arrive at an accurate 
conclusion based on deep and careful cognitive 
processing by reducing bias. If guided by directional 
motives, people undertake a more intense search of 
knowledge structures-- memories, beliefs, and rules—
to access only hypothesis confirming information, and 
in process, suppress disconfirming evidence [60]. 
Only information that supports prior beliefs is readily 
assimilated, and this information plays a rationalizing 
and legitimizing role in the preservation of ideological 
belief systems. Hence, people adopt ideological belief 
systems such as Political Conservatism as it satisfies 
their prior epistemic commitments and psychological 
needs and motives. 
3.3. Political Conservatism and Prejudice 
The word ideology was coined by Antoine Destutt de 
Tracy in 1796 during the Great Terror of the French 
Revolution, a phase of the revolution punctuated by 
unrestrained mob violence. Though initially a liberal 
philosophy, Napoleon, after pretending to share the 
liberalism with ideologists of Tracy’s National 
Institute, later referred to them pejoratively as 
"ideologues" when he consolidated power during the 
early months of the French Republic [11]. Since the 
time of the French Revolution, ideological opinions 
have been classified most often in terms of a single 
left-right dimension. In modern usage as well, 
ideology predominantly has a unidimensional 
connotation of a left-right divide, which has its roots 
from late 18th century sitting arrangement in the 
French Assembly Hall, where supporters of status quo 
were seated on the right side of the Assembly, and 
their opponents were seated on the left. In the United 
States and other parts of the world, it has been 
common to substitute “liberal” for “left” and 
“conservative” for “right” [22]. Though this 
unidimensional bipolar left-right model of ideological 
structure has been criticized in the literature, and 
multidimensional models of ideological structure have 
been proposed, the parsimonious unidimensional 
model has withstood the test of theoretical utility and 
empirical validity. Conservatism and Liberalism have 
consistently been shown to hold a negative 
relationship in numerous factor analytic studies [22]. 
In this paper, we adopt the unidimensional model, and 
we are particularly interested in the ideology of 
Conservatism, as it has been linked with various kinds 
of prejudicial dispositions both theoretically and 
empirically. Wilson [13] constructed the 
Conservatism Scale (C-Scale) and defined it as 
“resistance to change and the tendency to prefer safe, 
traditional and conventional forms of institutions and 
behavior” (p.4). Jost et al. [23] identify two core 
aspects of Conservatism. One core aspect is 
traditionalism and an opposition to change. The other 
core aspect is endorsement of inequality. These 
inclinations of political conservatives are generally 
associated with intolerance, prejudice, stereotyping, 
and hostility towards a wide variety of outgroups 
including stigmatized or disadvantaged groups. The 
prejudices include racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, 
homophobia, anti-Semitism, pseudo-patriotism, 
classism, disability discrimination, religious 
fundamentalism etc. Surprisingly, different kinds of 
prejudices often cluster together, and Allport [15] 
combined them as “generalized prejudice.” He stated 
that “One of the facts of which we are most certain is 
that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject 
other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely 
to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group” 
(p.66). Research over the years, grounded in theories 
of personality, documents various individual 
difference variables that predict the psychological 
basis of right wing ideology and associated prejudices. 
Certain situational factors also influence the 
expression of Conservatism and prejudices. We now 
illustrate the psychological and situational roots of 
generalized prejudice and political conservatism that 
we explicitly consider in our study. In terms of 
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Individual Differences, Right Wing Authoritarianism 
and Social Dominance Orientation positively 
influence prejudicial propensity, while Dispositional 
Empathy and Polyculturalism negatively influence it. 
Moreover, Mortality Salience is a Situational Factor 
that moderates the relationship. 
3.3.1. Individual Difference: Right Wing 
Authoritarianism. The tradition of singling out right 
wing rather than left wing ideology for special inquiry 
started with the authors of The Authoritarian 
Personality [48] in the backdrop of rising Fascism 
throughout Europe leading to World War II. Later 
there was a gradual loss of interest in this area due to 
several methodological and conceptual issues. 
Altemeyer [36] revived the interest by replacing 
Adorno and colleagues’ [48] Fascism Scale (F-Scale) 
with his Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale. 
There are three distinct socio political attitudes of 
Right Wing Authoritarians: (a) Conventionalism 
defined as “a high degree of adherence to the social 
conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by 
society;” (b) Authoritarian Submission defined as “a 
high degree of submission to the authorities who are 
perceived to be established and legitimate;” (c) 
Authoritarian Aggression defined as “a general 
aggressiveness, directed against various persons, 
which is perceived to be sanctioned by established 
authorities” [36] (p.148). However, there has been 
criticism that authoritarianism or dogmatism is also 
associated with left wing extremism. Indeed, studies 
on Russian samples show that authoritarianism is as 
much a characteristic of the Communist left as is a 
characteristic of the Western right [37]. However, 
empirical evidence is unequivocally skewed in favor 
of the “rigidity of the right hypothesis” [33]. 
Altemeyer [38] exclaims “authoritarian on the left has 
been as scarce as hens’ teeth in my samples” (p.71). In 
our western context we espouse this point of view. 
Notwithstanding the criticism, RWA has shown 
remarkable predictive power for generalized prejudice 
and political conservatism. Since persons high in 
RWA are generally prejudiced, discriminatory 
towards outgroups, and are inclined towards 
Conservative political orientation, we posit that they 
will be more likely to agree with prejudiced and 
ideologically aligned informational content 
irrespective of whether it is accurate or inaccurate. 
Hence, we put forward our first proposition. 
Proposition 1: Persons who are high in RWA will find 
prejudiced content to be more credible, depending on 
its Prominence in social media. 
3.3.2. Individual Difference: Social Dominance 
Orientation. Social Dominance Theory [12] 
postulates that societal and evolutionary factors 
determine the development of ideologically 
conservative self-placements. The theory suggests that 
human societies develop hierarchy-enhancing belief 
systems that justify hegemony of the dominant group 
over marginalized groups in order to minimize group 
conflict. This is realized by promulgating various 
“legitimizing myths,” such as (a) “paternalistic 
myths,” which maintain that dominant groups are 
indispensable to protect and lead subordinate groups 
who are incapable of doing so by themselves; (b) 
“sacred myths,” which claim that positions of 
supremacy are a divine right determined by the 
Almighty; (c) “reciprocal myths,” which proclaim that 
there is a preordained symbiotic exchange between the 
dominant and subordinate group that benefit each 
other. These ideological devices allow the primacy of 
one group over others in terms of economic status, 
race, ethnicity, gender, etc., and hinder social change 
in terms of equitable distribution of power, wealth, or 
social status. While high RWAs “fear that authority 
and conventions are crumbling so quickly that 
civilization will collapse, and they will be eaten in the 
resulting jungle,” people who score high on the Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale “already see life 
as ’dog eat dog‘ and-compared with most people -- are 
determined to do the eating” [38] (p.75) by becoming 
“the alpha animal” [38] (p.87). Duckitt and Sibley [17] 
reflect that “RWA should be more predictive of the 
conservative, religious, traditional, clerical brand of 
fascism characterized by Franco’s Spain, whereas 
SDO should be more predictive of the aggressive, 
dominative, militaristic fascism that was characterized 
by Hitler’s Nazi party” (p.1878). Over the years, RWA 
and SDO have together predicted an average of 50% 
of statistical variance in generalized prejudice, and 
Altemeyer [38] called them the “Lethal Union.” Like 
RWAs, high SDOs are generally prejudiced, 
discriminatory towards outgroups, and are inclined 
towards Conservative political orientation. Hence, we 
deduce that they will be more likely to agree with 
prejudiced and ideologically aligned informational 
content irrespective of whether it is accurate or 
inaccurate. Thus, our second proposition follows. 
Proposition 2: Persons who are high in SDO will find 
prejudiced content to be more credible, depending on 
its Prominence in social media. 
3.3.3. Individual Difference: Dispositional 
Empathy. While studying other roots of generalized 
prejudice, apart from RWA and SDO, McFarland and 
Adelson [42] in an omnibus study reported gender to 
be a significant determinant. Being male makes one 
more prejudiced than being female. Individual 
differences in gender reveal that females have higher 
dispositional Empathy, while males have higher 
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narcissism and masculinity. McFarland [43] studied 
these factors and detailed that dispositional Empathy 
was the third most important factor that predicted 
generalized prejudice along with RWA and SDO, and 
he termed them as the “Big Three.” Two primary 
facets of empathy have shown to be antithetical to 
prejudice: (a) “Empathic Concern,” which is a feeling 
of sympathy and compassion for unfortunate others; 
(b) “Perspective Taking,” which is a tendency to 
spontaneously adopt the perspective or psychological 
point of view of others [28]. Bäckström and Björklund 
[27] used a structural model and found that differences 
in Empathy, measured using subscales from Davis’ 
[28] Interpersonal Reactivity Index, primarily 
explained individual differences in prejudice 
stemming from sex differences. Compassion for others 
doubtlessly makes one more likely to sympathize with 
underprivileged outgroups and to appreciate their 
concerns. Therefore, we extend our third proposition.   
Proposition 3: Persons who are high in Empathy will 
find prejudiced content to be less credible, depending 
on its Prominence in social media.  
3.3.4. Individual Difference: Polyculturalism. A 
recent study by Rosenthal and Levy [24] investigated 
the intergroup ideology of Polyculturalism and 
communicated that Polyculturalism explained unique 
variance in prejudice over and above RWA and SDO. 
Polyculturalism was first proposed by historians 
Kelley [39] and Prashad [55,56], and it holds 
implications for racial and ethnic relations. People 
who endorse Polyculturalism focus on how cultures 
interact, influence and share ideas with each other and 
have done so throughout history. They do not view 
culture as static, unchanging entities that belong to a 
particular group but instead as deeply connected and 
shaped by mutual interactions among people. This is 
different from the concepts of Multiculturalism and 
Colorblindness. While Colorblindness de-emphasizes 
group categories such as race, ethnicity, etc., and focus 
on similarities among groups, Multiculturalism 
emphasizes the distinctness of racial/ethnic groups and 
focuses on understanding each other’s rich histories 
and customs. Though Polyculturalism, like 
Multiculturalism, recognizes racial and ethnic 
differences, its principal focus is on the 
“interconnections” among groups, unlike the focus on 
cross-group similarities in Colorblindness. As Kelley 
[39] puts it “All of us, and I mean ALL of us, are the 
inheritors of European, African, Native American, and 
even Asian pasts, even if we can’t exactly trace our 
blood lines to all of these continents” (p. 81). Since, 
Polyculturalism fosters positive intergroup contact, 
greater interest in diversity, and greater appreciation 
for differences, it has been shown to reduce prejudice 
such as sexism and discrimination towards the 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex 
(LGBTI) community. This leads to our fourth 
proposition. 
Proposition 4: Persons who are high in 
Polyculturalism will find prejudiced content to be less 
credible, depending on its Prominence in social media.  
3.3.5. Situational Factor: Mortality Salience. Now 
that we have looked at the Individual Differences in 
the above sections, we turn our attention to a 
situational factor that may influence the relationships 
between Individual Differences and Prominence. 
Allport [15] in his classical essay expressed that 
prejudice is not rooted just in personality differences. 
It is also influenced by a group’s specific history, 
sociocultural setting, and situational factors. The 
situational factor we canvas is Mortality Salience, 
which has a long history in research related to 
prejudice. According to Terror Management Theory 
[21], fear of death is rooted in the basic human instinct 
of self-preservation. This instinctive drive and an 
awareness of the inevitability of death creates 
paralyzing terror. Culture and concomitant 
worldviews act as an anxiety buffer by which human 
beings cope with this existential threat arising out of 
the thoughts of one’s own mortality. To the extent that 
this cultural worldview buffer allows human beings to 
symbolically transcend death, the reminder of death 
elicits strong negative response to events that violate 
the cultural worldview and positive response to events 
that uphold the worldview. Hence, salience of one’s 
own mortality engenders defense and justification of 
cultural worldviews and systems of meaning such as 
religion and intolerance for alternative social or 
political worldviews. Over time, research has 
established that conservative thoughts and behaviors 
are amplified under a heightened sense of terror 
leading to more prejudice. Consequently, we submit 
our fifth proposition. 
 Proposition 5: Mortality Salience interacts with, and 
hence moderates the relationship between Individual 
Differences and the Prominence of social media 
content. 
Our conceptual model is in Figure 2. In the model, 
Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance 
Orientation, Dispositional Empathy, and Endorsement 
of Polyculturalism are the Individual Differences 
which affect Prominence. Prominence mediates the 
relationship between Individual Differences and 
Credibility assessment. Mortality Salience moderates 
the relationship between Individual Differences and 
Prominence.  
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 Figure 2. Conceptual Model 
4. Implications 
We have proposed a novel framework to study online 
disinformation by marrying the literatures from 
Deception Detection and Social and Political 
Psychology.  EPIT provides the foundation on which 
we build our model, and we reckon that individual 
differences may hold the key to understanding why 
online disinformation spreads, and what makes people 
so susceptible. As such, we broaden EPIT itself and 
apply it in the specific context of prejudicially 
motivated online deception. If our propositions are 
empirically established, it may unlock new avenues 
about how online disinformation is countered, and on 
the downside it may provide ammunition to offenders 
about how and whom to target with their malicious 
content. We also introduce several scales from the 
Social and Political Psychology literature which have 
hitherto not been used in the Information Systems 
discipline.  As for other research in this area, 
Pennycook and Rand [14] have investigated the role of 
analytic thinking in the detection of “fake news,” and 
they have shown that right leaning individuals who 
supported one US Presidential candidate over the other 
engaged in less analytical thinking and were less able 
to detect fake from real news, compared to left leaning 
individuals who supported the rival. But ours is a 
larger perspective. We do not restrict ourselves to 
political party or candidate affiliations but deal with 
broader conceptions of prejudice and conservatism. 
But, this is only half of the story. Here we ignore the 
linkage between prejudice and liberalism, and the 
disinformation campaigns that also plague the left 
leaning media ecosystem. This calls for further 
research that restores parity. As Greenberg and Jonas 
[20], in their rejoinder to Jost et al. [23], had aptly 
reminded, “psychological theorizing and research on 
political attitudes always run the risk of being guided 
by the motivated social cognition of the theorists and 
researchers on the basis of their own sociopolitical 
views,” and there should be a “counterweight toward 
balance and diversity in the application of motivated 
social cognition to understanding the determinants of 
political orientation.”     
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